Description: "Crisis, Reforms - and the Military" documents the second conference in a trilogy with which the Prussian Historical Commission and the Privy State Archives of the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation commemorated Prussia's catastrophe of 1806 and the subsequent phase of reconstruction and modernization. In the context of the cultural and social science approaches of modern military history and against the backdrop of Prussian criticism of the army in the 18th century (with key texts edited here for the first time), the reform measures of Ruchel, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau were examined in detail, thus highlighting the different ways in which the generals considered change before and after 1806, the significance of the defeats at Jena and Auerstedt in their perception and interpretation of the Prussian army, and the extent to which the army reforms were linked to the transformation of the state. It was believed that standards for the desired general national liberation struggle in the new form of a quasi-contained popular uprising could even be found in the Spanish guerrilla war, without taking into account its social and clerical preconditions. The year 1806 thus served as a catalyst, bringing people initially active in the background into key positions and ultimately helping their ideas to achieve a breakthrough. Between 1813 and 1815, it became clear how much the reforms had increased the fighting power of the Prussian army and made a significant contribution to the defeat of Napoleon. Separated from the resulting myth, many of the innovations were retained, others rejected as too revolutionary, and others modified. The decades between 1815 and 1861 illuminated once again that there was no standstill in the Prussian army, but rather a development that, on the one hand, proceeded successfully at varying speeds, but on the other, also took detours or temporarily reached dead ends.
