Description:
This book shows why the delegation of discretionary powers to professionals in the front-line of the welfare state is both unavoidable and problematic. It adds an epistemic dimension to the structural understanding of discretion, distinguishing between structural and epistemic measures of accountability.
Review Quotes:
'What emerges from this 'little book', is a concise but convincing account of the analytical
distinction between structural and epistemic discretion which is far more accessible than the work
of Alexy (2000) it is inspired by. Molander demonstrates the practical application of his arguments
when addressing concerns over accountability, providing an insight into how the distinction offers
more than simply a theoretical tool for examining tensions in the granting of discretion (i.e. with
the 'rule of law' or 'democratic control'), but can also bear fruit when applied to the real-world
management of discretion decision-making in a welfare bureaucracy.'
Jed Meers York Law School, University of York, UK