Description: Constitutional political economy has emerged as an indispensable part of political economy. This book offers a concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to this topic. What effects - if any - do constitutions have within autocracies? Can small electoral districts help reduce corruption? Does a country's leadership affect the size of its government? Can direct democratic institutions increase politicians' accountability to citizens? Stefan Voigt, a pioneer in the field, explores these questions and more throughout the course of this cutting-edge primer. As the number of courses in constitutional economics continues to grow, this book fills an important gap in the literature. This highly original project maintains curiosity about the questions it generates, identifying potential new areas of research whilst successfully demonstrating the impact constitutional rules have on political economy.
Brief description: Stefan Voigt is a professor at the University of Hamburg, director of its Institute of Law & Economics, and editor of Constitutional Political Economy.
Review Quotes: 'Over the last 30 years or so, 'constitutional political economy' has emerged as an important branch of political economy, or more broadly political science and economics. This Primer presents a comprehensive survey of the diverse literatures that are relevant for the field. Although primarily designed for use in the classroom, it provides an excellent introduction to the field for scholars unfamiliar with this literature. Moreover, Stefan Voigt surveys such a vast number of relevant contributions that even scholars working within the field will discover works with which they were unfamiliar.' Dennis Mueller, Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Vienna