Description: A globe-spanning group of leading law and finance scholars bring together cutting-edge research to comprehensively examine the challenges legislators face in regulating related party transactions in a socially beneficial way. Combining theoretical analysis of the foundations of efficient regulation with empirical and comparative studies, readers are invited to draw their own conclusions on which regulatory responses work best under differing circumstances. The careful selection of surveyed jurisdictions offers in-depth insight into a broad variety of regulatory strategies and their interdependence with socioeconomic and political conditions. This work should be read by scholars, policymakers, and graduate students interested in a critical, much-debated area of corporate governance.
Brief description: Luca Enriques is the Allen and Overy Professor of Corporate Law at the University of Oxford and ECGI Research Fellow. He has published widely in the fields of corporate law and securities regulation. He is a coauthor of The Anatomy of Corporate Law (3rd edition, 2017) and of Principles of Financial Regulation (2016) and has held visiting positions, among others, at Harvard Law School and University of Cambridge.
Review Quotes: 'With patterns of concentrated ownership expanding even in the US, where tech entrepreneurs leverage control via higher voting shares, related-party transactions have become more ubiquitous than in the past. In this book, the world's leading academics address the new pattern, reflecting on how to police them. Don't miss it.' Ronald J. Gilson, Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University, and Marc and Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University