Description: Bargaining between states in the international system is governed by rules which shape and constrain their bargaining behavior. However, these rules can be changed. When, why, and how do states bargain differently? Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates how the rules of the game influence the cooperative or coercive nature of the strategies adopted by all states in a negotiation. These effects influence each state's incentives regarding whether to play by the rules or to change them. Examining these incentives, as well as the conditions under which states can act on them, McKibben explains the wide variation in states' bargaining strategies. Several bargaining interactions are analyzed, including decision-making in the European Union, multilateral trade negotiations, climate change negotiations, and negotiations over the future status of Kosovo. This book provides a rich understanding of the nuances of states' behavior in international bargaining processes.
Brief description: Heather Elko McKibben is an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Davis. She received her PhD in political science at the University of Pittsburgh. Prior to her current position, she held a postdoctoral research fellowship at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance in the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, New Jersey.
Review Quotes: "Uses extensive empirical research to cast fresh light on the understudied question of why states use different bargaining strategies at different times. Other scholars should read this interesting contribution."
John Odell, University of Southern California