Description: This book proposes a new theory of Senate agenda setting that reconciles a divide in literature between the conventional wisdom - in which party power is thought to be mostly, if not completely, undermined by Senate procedures and norms - and the apparent partisan bias in Senate decisions noted in recent empirical studies. Chris Den Hartog and Nathan W. Monroe's theory revolves around a "costly consideration" framework for thinking about agenda setting, where moving proposals forward through the legislative process is seen as requiring scarce resources. To establish that the majority party pays lower agenda consideration costs through various procedural advantages, the book features a number of chapters examining partisan influence at several stages of the legislative process, including committee reports, filibusters and cloture, floor scheduling, and floor amendments. Not only do the results strongly support the book's theoretical assumption and key hypotheses, but they shed new light on virtually every major step in the Senate's legislative process.
Brief description: Chris Den Hartog is an assistant professor of political science at California Polytechnic State University. He has published articles and chapters about the legislative process in Congress, its evolution across history, and its effects on congressional policy making. Professor Den Hartog's work includes studies of the nineteenth-century House and the contemporary House and Senate.
Review Quotes: "There is a tension between the conventional wisdom about Senate parties and certain empirical realities...Chris Den Hartog and Nathan Monroe's book Agenda Setting in the U.S. Senate expertly addresses this timely topic. It fills a sizeable void in the political science literature, which has largely resisted systematic theorizing about Senate party influence ... This is an extremely well-executed book that makes a valuable contribution to the congressional literature." -Ryan J. Vander Wielen, Temple University, Congress & The Presidency