Description:
This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.
Review Quotes:
'Nuclear Alliance Restraint is a fascinating and well-researched book that explains when powerful states are likely to prevent their weaker allies from acquiring nuclear weapons. Whereas many experts fear increased nuclear proliferation now that unipolarity has ended and great-power competition is back with a vengeance, Lee and Alexandrova argue the opposite. Let's hope they are right!'
John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, USA
'Nuclear Alliance Restraint adopts a bold approach to understanding a crucially important question--under what conditions do powerful states fail to stop weaker allies from acquiring nuclear weapons? The authors develop a structural theory that focuses on polarity--the number of superpowers--and geography. Their high-level theory provides a parsimonious, yet nuanced, understanding of the credibility and leverage of the major power's carrots and sticks, and produces crucial insights that are missing from theories that focus instead on the characteristics of individual states. Nuclear Alliance Restraint greatly advances our understanding of nuclear proliferation, as well as the dynamics of asymmetric alliances.'
Charles L. Glaser, Senior Fellow in the MIT Security Studies Program and Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, USA