Description:
This book questions the wide use of the majority voting rule in many constitutional courts to declare statutes unconstitutional, and argues that supermajority voting rules should be used instead. To declare statutes unconstitutional, it is argued that more than 50% of the judges present plus one judge present should be required.
Review Quotes:
'A must-read for anyone interested in the institutional design of courts! Cristóbal Caviedes has produced a superb, deep and surprising piece of scholarship that invites the readers to rethink conventional wisdom by providing strong reasons for replacing majority rule with supermajority rules in constitutional review.'
Yaniv Roznai, Reichman University, Israel
'In this insightful book, Cristóbal Caviedes fills a major gap in scholarship on institutional design and constitutional review. Identifying the importance and neglect of judicial decision procedures, he presents a rigorously argued case for supermajority voting rules on constitutional courts. A tour de force.'
Stephen Gardbaum, UCLA School of Law
'An indispensable book for anyone concerned with the politization of courts and the legitimacy of their decisions.'
Francisco J Urbina, University of Notre Dame