Description: This Element presents a philosophical exploration of the notion of scientific representation. It does so by focussing on an important class of scientific representations, namely scientific models. Models are important in the scientific process because scientists can study a model to discover features of reality. But what does it mean for something to represent something else? This is the question discussed in this Element. The authors begin by disentangling different aspects of the problem of representation and then discuss the dominant accounts in the philosophical literature: the resemblance view and inferentialism. They find them both wanting and submit that their own preferred option, the so-called DEKI account, not only eschews the problems that beset these conceptions, but further provides a comprehensive answer to the question of how scientific representation works. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Review Quotes: 'The writing is clear, the argumentation is careful and compelling, the examples are engaging and on point. The book can be a very useful resource for undergraduate students taking philosophy of science courses, as well as for philosophers from other areas interested in getting a good, quick overview of the recent discussions around scientific representation and modelling ... Overall, this is a very good book, and a precious resource for students and teachers alike.' Dimitri Coelho Mollo, Metascience