Description: Andrew Scobell examines the use of Chinese military force abroad as in Korea (1950), Vietnam (1979), and the Taiwan Strait (1995-1996) and domestically, as during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and in the 1989 military crackdown in Tiananmen square. Scobell warns that a "Cult of Defense" disposes Chinese leaders to rationalize all military deployment as defensive. However, changes in the People's Liberation Army's doctrine and capabilities over the past two decades suggest that China's 21st Century leaders may use military force more readily than their predecessors.
Review Quotes: "In this thoughtful, thoroughly researched study of traditional Chinese views about the military and Beijing's present-day use of force, Scobell concludes that the traditional 'cult of defense' blended realpolitik and Confucian pacifism--allowing the Chinese to convince themselves that thet used force only as a last resort and thus to commit to warfare with abandon when they deemed it necessary. The bulk of the book consists of case studies...for which he draws on the latest scholarship and newly opened Chinese and Russian archives). He finds that the Chinese military is far from a monolithic institution, and that its relationship with the state has changed considerably over time....In the end, the Chinese come out looking neither as pacific as many believe nor as bellicose as others fear." Foreign Affairs