Description: This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, they argue, it was the oligarchs' very inability to agree among themselves on how to rule that prompted them to cut the military loose from civilian control--a decision that was to have disastrous consequences not only for Japan but for the rest of the world.
Review Quotes: "What do Ramseyer and Rosenbluth contribute to our knowledge with this work? Two things merit attention in our opinion. First, they offer striking data to support their contention that politcal parties demonstrably affected the path of bureaucratic careers during the 1920's and 1930s....Second, we believe that Ramseyer and Rosenbluth are asking some of the right systematic-level questions. How did the system function, and what mechanisms supported its function? How was change achieved in the system? " Joseph Gownder and Robert Pekkanen, Journal of Japanese Studies