Description: Does establishing representative democracy increase commitment to repaying public debt? This book develops a new theory about the link between debt and democracy and applies it to a classic historical comparison: eighteenth century Great Britain (which had strong representative institutions and sound public finance) vs. ancien regime France (which had neither). The study asserts that whether representative institutions improve commitment depends on the opportunities for government creditors to form coalitions with other groups. It is relevant to developing country governments with implications for government policy where credibility is a concern.
Review Quotes: "...offers a new approach to the subject. (Stasavage) is therefore able to buttress by his economic models the arguments previously advanced by historians to explain Britain's success and France's failure to develop an effective system of public credit in the eighteenth century. This makes his work of considerable value to those historians who have relied upon traditional approaches to these important questions." H.T. Dickinson, The International History Review