Description:
The book offers an analysis of common law, contract law, property law, agency law, partnership law, trust law, and corporate statutory law using judicial rulings that proves shareholders do not own corporations, that there is no separation of ownership and control, and shareholders are not investors in corporations.
Review Quotes:
"During the last decades, many areas of the law have been tainted by simplistic economic analyses. Nowhere is this truer than in corporate law, where property rights and agency relationship have been identified when they are absent. Shareholders do not own corporations; they own shares. And Directors and officers are not the shareholders' agents; they are the agents of the corporation. Dennis Huber has written a serious book evidencing these contradictions and the need to bring back corporate law's lost logic. It is a must for business lawyers and for economists willing to address the complexity of the legal structure of the firm." -- Jean-Philippe Robé, SciencesPo Law School
"Huber's book is one of the most interesting discussions of the relations between law and the economics of the firm to appear in decades. It asserts, in some key respects, the primacy of the law and argues that most of the economics of the firm literature pays too little attention to the law. I don't agree with everything in it, but the book is surely an impressive undertaking that should be of significant inspiration to economists and other social scientists." -- Nicolai J. Foss, Copenhagen Business School.