Review Quotes: "This book attempts to discern the similarities of policy of the US and the Soviet Union when they intervene politically or indirectly during potentially revolutionary situations in other countries. The major case studies for the US are China (1945 to 1949), Vietnam (1961 to 1965), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1970 to 1973); for the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia (1945), Hungary (1965), Poland (1956 and 1980 to 1981), and Afghanistan (1979). Although most of the contributors are political scientists, they rank historical memories consistently among the most important reasons for intervention. Other reasons are: international context, view of the enemy', cost-benefit calculations, and shifting bureaucratic coalitions. Although cultural arrogance played a larger role in US interventions than Soviet, both superpowers lacked detailed knowledge of the political structures and personalities of the countries in which they intervened. The US and the Soviet Union have historically overestimated and distorted the threat to themselves of the revolutionary regimes, a position that increased the hostility of the object countries.... Upper-division and graduate collections."-Choice
