Description: Are animals worthy recipients of justice? If so, what do we owe them, and what is to be gained by using the language of justice when considering our duties toward them? This innovative book argues that not only are animals worthy recipients of justice, but that the language of justice offers a stronger base of claims for animal advocates than does the language of ethics or morality. Contending that a genuinely political theory of animal rights must go beyond the level of ideal theory, this is the first account of animal ethics to use nonideal theory to plot a course from where we are now to where we want to be. Robert Garner argues that a valid theory of justice for animals should be rights-based, and that animals have a right to not suffer at the hands of humans. At the same time, he argues that humans have a greater interest in life and liberty than most species of nonhuman animals. Tackling animal ethics as it relates to justice and non-ideal theory, this is a seminal work that will challenge traditional approaches and offer a compelling new vision of animal justice.
Review Quotes: "In this highly anticipated book, Robert Garner presents a clear and persuasive new theory of justice for animals. Because the theory aims to be feasible, and attuned to what can be achieved given the realities of our societies, the book is required reading for all those interested in the future of animal protection." --Alasdair Cochrane, Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Sheffield
"In this pathbreaking book Garner leaves us in no doubt that animals would be better off as recipients of justice than mere objects of moral concern. Combining imagination with a compelling pragmatism, he pulls off the unique feat of persuading us not only that animals deserve justice but that they can be granted it without overturning the political order as we know it." --Andy Dobson, Professor of Politics, Keele University
"The book makes important contributions to ongoing debates about our obligations to animals, and about the grounds of those obligations." --Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews