Description: Fearing the loss of Korea and Vietnam would touch off a chain reaction of other countries turning communist, the United States fought two major wars in the hinterlands of Asia. What accounts for such exaggerated alarm, and what were its consequences? Is a fear of the domino effect permanently rooted in the American strategic psyche, or has the United States now adopted a less alarmist approach? The essays in this book address these questions by examining domino thinking in United States and Soviet Cold War strategy, and in earlier historic settings. Combining theory and history in analyzing issues relevant to current public policy, Dominoes and Bandwagons examines the extent to which domino fears were a rational response, a psychological reaction, or a tactic in domestic politics.
Review Quotes: "The aim of this fascinating volume is to shed light on domino and bandwagon theory, and the contributors do an excellent job of achieving that objective....A first-class addition to the literature."--Pacific Review
"The thesis is clearly ennunciated with commendable clarity."--The Times Higher Education Supplement"There have been remarkably few systematic, scholarly analyses of the domino theory or empirical/historical evaluations of its validity. This excellent book has gone a long way to fill the gap."--American Political Science Review