Description: The Fear of Invasion presents a new interpretation of British preparation for War before 1914. It argues that protecting the British Isles from invasion was the foundation upon which all other plans for the defence of the Empire were built up. Home defence determined the amount of resources available for other tasks and the relative focus of the Army and Navy, as both played an important role in preventing an invasion. As politicians were reluctant to prepare for offensive British participation in a future war, home defence became the means by which the government contributed to an ill-defined British 'grand' strategy.
The Royal Navy formed the backbone of British defensive preparations. However, after 1905 the Navy came to view the threat of a German invasion of the British Isles as a far more credible threat than is commonly realised. As the Army became more closely associated with operations in France, the Navy thus devoted an ever-greater amount of time and effort to safeguarding the vulnerable east coast. In this manner preventing an invasion came to exert a 'very insidious' effect on the Navy by the outbreak of War in 1914. This book explains how and why this came to pass, and what it can tell us about the role of government in forming strategy.Review Quotes:
"[A] brilliantly argued and impressively well-researched monograph. Morgan-Owen's book will doubtless become a key reference alongside existing works on pre-Great War British war planning, and offers important new insight into the workings of the political and military leadership who tried to decide how to pursue an offensive military policy while also defending the heart of the empire itself."--Christian Melby, Reviews in History
"Recommended."--S. A. Syme, CHOICE
"There is a wealth of detail in The Fear of Invasion, which takes the reader through a tale of Victorian and Edwardian inter-service rivalry, febrile national politics, huge defence budgets but a painful lack of readily available cash, seemingly unending overseas commitments and a global scene that was at best confusing and at worse downright dangerous. Delete the words 'Victorian and Edwardian' and the thoughtful reader could easily start to draw parallels to today. That is one of the joys of well-written history: without necessarily setting out to do so, it allows us to take stock of our own woes and, if we are lucky, start to see a way through them. Unfortunately, a century ago the conglomeration of strategy, politics and military planning throughout Europe led to catastrophic war. We must hope that the many similarities to evident to contemporary events in this book end short of full replication."--Commander Kevin Rowlands RN, The Naval Review
"Morgan-Owen's important book reminds us of the fundamental importance of civilian political leadership to strategy making and war-planning. He offers a study of the failure of this leadership in the years leading up to World War I, and a timely lesson about the dangers of a strategy based on fear of new threats, rather than on an appreciation of one's own strengths."--Professor John Bew, War on the Rocks
"This is a fundamentally new way of looking at the position of Britain in 1914. Most historians have assumed that what happened to the BEF had to happen. Morgan-Owen suggests otherwise, and his arguments will be required reading for anyone dealing with British policy on the outbreak of war. Was there an alternative to the Western Front? Did the incapacity of the navy condemn Britain to the killing fields of France and Flanders? Raising questions such as these will have a profound effect on the intellectual approach to the entire field. Few books manage such a feat. David Morgan-Owen has achieved a great deal with this first book. I look forward to his subsequent work, which might help settle some of the uncertainties he has now raised."--Professor Robin Prior, Wartime